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Abstract—In reservation-based MAC protocols, adversaries that
have compromised a node can perform an efficient denial-of-
service attack by sending excessive reservation requests. Attackers,
having thus prevented legitimate users from using some fraction
of the bandwidth, can then use their power for jamming the
legitimate transmissions instead of transmitting on the reserved
channel. We propose a countermeasure which forces attackers to
choose between the two attacks and restricts the optimal attacker
behavior to physical-layer jamming, which in general is a weaker
attack than over-reservation, when attackers are the minority of
the network. Our work consists of a bandwidth allocation scheme
that maximizes spectral efficiency and thus provides optimal
performance and a channel coordination mechanism where users
exchange and reach a consensus channel reservation in both
centralized and distributed settings. By theoretical analysis and
simulations, we demonstrate a substantial performance gain over
the case where no countermeasure is utilized.
I. INTRODUCTION
Wireless networks share a transmission medium. As demands
for wireless communication increase, it is becoming impor-
tant to utilize the communication medium more efficiently.
To support transmissions from multiple users, the medium is
divided into many communication channels. Typical channel
access schemes are Time Division Multiple Access (TDMA),
Frequency Division Multiple Access (FDMA), and Code Di-
vision Multiple Access (CDMA). These schemes interleave
the use of transmission medium in time, frequency, and code,
respectively. Since a data network is characterized by bursty
arrivals, communication systems use a Medium Access Control
(MAC) protocol to effectively coordinate the channel use of
the network users; such protocols not only establish a link
between a communicating transmitter-receiver pair but are also
useful for helping transmitters to avoid each other to minimize
interference. In order to avoid interference, these protocols are
designed so that each channel is used by at most one user at
any time. We say that a user reserves a channel prior to its data
transmission when it notifies all the other users of its use of
the channel.
We focus on a multi-channel environment, where the fre-
quency spectrum is divided into multiple channels and many
users compete for bandwidth, with power-limited attackers
(however, our work can also be applied to single-channel
TDMA systems with energy-limited attackers). We aim to
design a spectrum channel allocation mechanism where we
assign bandwidth to the network users to maximize the overall
performance in the presence of malicious entities who perform
Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks. In particular, we are mainly
concerned about false reservation attacks where an insider
attacker (who compromised a legitimate network node) requests
channel resource, i.e., bandwidth, with the intention of denying
it to other users. This attack takes relatively small amount
of attacker resources (to transmit control messages) and takes
resources out of the network disproportionately to attacker
effort. We consider jamming attack on legitimate transmissions
as the attacker’s best alternative attack; however, jamming is
less efficient than false reservation since it requires more power
consumption for attackers.
Our countermeasure for false reservation attack is two-
fold: bandwidth allocation and channel coordination. First, we
propose to allocate bandwidth to a user based on the power
received from the user, and thus forcing attackers to emit power
on the reserved channel to make future reservation requests.
Then, we design a channel coordination scheme where all users
agree on and distribute the bandwidth assignment. We begin by
describing a centralized channel coordination scheme where
there is a trusted authority, e.g., access point in WiFi, who
coordinates the users’ spectrum use. Afterwards, we devise a
distributed scheme where the receivers reach a consensus to
allocate bandwidth to users. Since it is hard to individually
detect attackers and exclude attackers from contributing to the
coordination process, a distributed scheme introduces another
vulnerability which attackers take advantage of by sharing
false information for coordination. We show that, with our
countermeasure, the optimal DoS attackers’ strategy becomes
physical-layer jamming, as opposed to the more efficient false
reservation attack, when attackers comprise the minority of
the network. Our scheme not only successfully counters false
reservation attack but also yields the optimal performance
maximizing the aggregate rate of the network.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II,
we review previous work that deals with attacks on availability
such as over-reservation for reservation-based MAC protocols
and physical-layer jamming. Next, we establish the setup of our
investigation in Section III. In Section IV, we present our threat
model and assumptions about attackers. We introduce our se-
cure channel reservation scheme in Section V and theoretically
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2analyze the performance and the attacker’s optimal strategy in
Section VI. Afterwards, we evaluate our scheme via simulations
in Section VII and conclude our work in Section VIII.
II. RELATED WORK
Our work considers a Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacker (ca-
pable not only of physical-layer jamming but also of send-
ing bogus requests to reserve channel). Previous literature
(e.g., [1]–[6]) describe an adversarial attacker who can send
excessive reservation messages to prevent legitimate nodes
from using the channel. Negi and Arjeswaran [4] consider
an adversarial model similar to ours where attackers exploit
MAC-layer vulnerabilities to be power efficient. Unlike our
scheme, however, their scheme which revokes reservation if
there is no data transmission assumes a detection scheme for
malicious behaviors and places more restraints on attackers’
power capabilities. Also, the effectiveness of the scheme is
sensitive to parameter choices so that the reservation period
and the detection period must be chosen wisely (thus requiring
information about network topology).
Another form of DoS attack is channel jamming where adver-
saries inject noise to disrupt transmissions. Previous work [7]–
[10] propose mechanisms for avoiding jamming, but, unlike
our work, these approaches do not contemplate the possibility
that jammers are compromised network participants and thus
have access to some of the keys of the network nodes (in this
paper, we assume that attackers only use the insider information
for false reservation attack but not for channel jamming;
we solve the intelligent jamming attack where attackers use
insider information to facilitate more effective jamming on data
transmissions in another orthogonal work that is currently under
review). Also, in contrast to many prior jamming-aware MAC
protocols, our work considers an attacker that is power-limited
rather than energy-limited, and thus can jam all of the time.
III. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider a scenario in which there are T non-idle
transmitters, which compose the set T (each user is indexed
with i where i ∈ T = {1, 2, . . . , T}), that share a frequency
band with a total bandwidth W . In T , there are M malicious
attackers, each identified by an index k ∈M = {1, 2, . . . ,M},
and the rest of them are protocol-compliant. All users operate
on open spectrum and communicate directly, i.e., no com-
munication relies on a third node to relay the message to
the final destination node. For our model, we also assume
that all users are within transmission range of each other,
so that any transmission is heard by every user. Thus, when
two or more users operate on the same channel, they collide.
However, users who operate on different frequency channels,
i.e., non-overlapping portion of spectrum, do not interfere with
each other. All data communication is unicast, whereas control
packets are broadcasted as described in Section III-A.
All users have equal priorities for transmission and their
contributions to the overall network performance are weighted
equally. Thus, attackers do not target a specific group of users
and their optimal jammer strategy becomes wideband jamming
across the entire frequency band as detailed in Section IV.
Assuming this optimal jammer strategy and that every portion
of the spectrum is expected to be subject to equal amount of
fading, legitimate users do not need to hop across frequen-
cies to avoid narrowband interference, i.e., frequency hopping
spread spectrum, which technique is typically used to counter
jammming on narrowband users.
In order to prevent forgery of reservation messages, we
authenticate control packets containing channel reservation
information by cryptographically signing them. This not only
eliminates spoofing attacks or forgery of packets but also pro-
vides non-repudiation (and thus all users who reserve channels
are held accountable for their actions). We assume an offline
third party that not only a priori distributes public key-private
key pairs to all nodes in the network but also provides direct
validation of an entity, e.g., via reverse lookup, to prevent sybil
attack (where one entity fakes multiple identities).
A. Secure Broadcast
In order to reserve a channel and notify all the other users
of the channel use, we require jamming-resistant broadcast.
The literature contains proposals for secure broadcast [11]–
[13]. Baird et al. [11] suggest the BBC coding algorithm, in
which they encode data using indelible marks (so that jammers
can not erase a message, even though they can decode it).
Strasser et al. [12] propose Uncoordinated Frequency Hopping,
in which users send and listen on random frequency channels
without pre-shared keys in order to establish a spontaneous
link. Chiang and Hu [13] use binary key tree scheme to detect
and isolate each jammed key by introducing asymmetry of
knowledge between the sender and any set of receivers in the
network (so that no other nodes in the network have as much
information as the sender). We can use any such protocols to
broadcast our control messages to the network.
B. Channelization
In this paper, we diverge from the conventional slotted
channelization approach (where the spectrum is consisted of
channels with fixed bandwidth and static location). In particular,
by allocating channels with varying bandwidth and center
frequency, we can more effectively match the needs of the users
when assigning bandwidth and increase our system’s spectral
efficiency.
Many researchers, in a non-security framework, already
adopted the channelization approach with flexible boundaries
for frequency channels. Yuan et al. [14] proposed a distributed
spectrum allocation scheme where they dynamically adjust the
operating frequency carrier, the occupancy time, and com-
munication bandwidth. Bahl et al. [15] also proposes such
a scheme in a cognitive radio environment (where the users
have an additional restriction of being non-intrusive to the
licensed users). Split Wideband Interferer Friendly Technology
(SWIFT) [16] is designed for Ultra Wideband communication
(UWB) users and enables them to operate on non-contiguous
frequency band while avoiding the portion that is occupied
by narrowband users. While allowing varying bandwidth and
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scheme where users distributively rearrange their frequency
use so that unoccupied frequency blocks are merged into a
large contiguous range (effectively decreasing the guardband
overhead). Unlike SWIFT and Jello, our scheme does not
require the hardware capability of non-contiguous frequency
access (However, as described in Section IV, we assume that
attackers have such capability to describe the optimal attacker
strategy).
C. Performance Metric
We use Shannon capacity as our performance metric. When-
ever user i transmits to user j, it does so on a frequency channel
that varies with time according to the frequency hopping
pattern, pre-shared between user i and user j. At any point in
time, the user transmits on frequency channel with bandwidth
Wi and at carrier frequency fi. Assuming a flat fading Gaussian
channel with Gaussian signals, the capacity of the link i → j
is:
Ri =
∫ fi+Wi/2
fi−Wi/2
log2 [1 + Λi,j(f)] df (1)
where Λi,j is the SINR:
Λi,j =
γi,jP˜i(f)
N0 +
∑
`6=i,`∈Mc [γ`,jP˜`(f)] +
∑
k∈M[γk,jP˜k(f)]
(2)
In Equation 2, γa,b is the channel gain between transmitter
a and receiver b, N0 is the power spectral density of noise,
Mc are the indices of legitimate users, M are the indices
of jammers, P˜x(f) is the user x’s transmitted power spectral
density (the subscript x determines whether it is signal,
unintentional interference, or malicious jamming power
spectral density).
Since the rate performance is determined at the communi-
cation receiver, we reconstruct our performance metric using
received power (as opposed to the transmitted power). First,
we place power constraints to all users including attackers:
γi,j ·
∫
P˜i(f) df ≤ Pi,j , ∀i ∈ T
where Pi,j indicates the upper bound for the received power
of the signal from user i to user j. Pi,j is a function of both
P˜i and γi,j (which depends on the distance between the two
users). For our analysis, we assume uniform channel gains
across all channels, i.e., γi,j = γa,b = γ, ∀i,∀j,∀a,∀b, and
thus, Pi,j = Pi, ∀j ∈ T ∩ {i}c (defining Pi to be the received
power corresponding to the maximum transmitting power of
user i). This assumption yields a lower bound on the expected
capacity, because of Jensen’s Inequality and the fact that Ri
is a convex function of γ (see Section III-D). Also, as Ri is
a monotonically increasing function of Pi, the transmitter will
emit at full power and maximize the signal power Pi. From
Equation 1, this yields the expected capacity expression:
E[Ri] ≥Wi log2
[
1 + PiN0·Wi+
∑
`6=i,`∈Mc I`·P`+
∑
k∈N Jk·Pk
]
(3)
where Pi is the transmitter i’s signal power, I` is the amount
of user `’s power that interferes with the transmitter’s signal
normalized with respect to the power constraint, P`, Jk is the
attacker k’s jamming power normalized to the power constraint,
Pk (and thus, Jk·Pk = γk,i·
∫ fc+Wi/2
fc−Wi/2 P˜k(f) df, ∀i ∈ T ∩{i}c).
We use the expression on the right-hand side of Equation 3
(which is worse than the actual capacity) for the performance
of user i.
Our goal is to maximize the performance of the overall
network. We introduce a network utility function, U that is
the aggregate rate of the users:
U =
∑
i∈T
E[Ri] =
∑
i∈Mc
E[Ri] (4)
The second equality comes from the fact that the attackers make
no contribution to the network; they, in fact, aim to do the
contrary and degrade the network performance as described in
Section IV.
D. Jensen’s Inequality
From Equation 3, we observe that our performance metric
is convex with respect to attacker’s emitted power and concave
with respect to legitimate transmitter’s signal power. We use
this property to analyze the attacker behavior in Section IV and
Section VI-C and our scheme in Section V-A. Here, we provide
an overview and a brief intuition of Jensen’s inequality. Jensen’s
inequality states that, given a function (in our case, network
utility U ) which is convex with respect to a variable input (at-
tacker’s jamming power Jk ·Pk), E[U(Jk ·Pk)] ≥ U(E[Jk ·Pk]).
A corollary to Jensen’s inequality, relying on the concavity of
our performance metric to signal power, yields that using the
expected signal power across all channels results in maximum
performance and is used for analyzing legitimate transmitter’s
strategy. Therefore, users will choose to emit on the expected
power level (attackers to minimize network performance and
legitimate users to maximize it). In a multi-channel environ-
ment, this corresponds to water-filling where users emit on
each channel so that all channels have equal SINR, as opposed
to focusing their power on a subset of channels. In a single-
channel TDMA environment, Jensen’s inequality yields that,
given that you equally weigh the performance for all time (that
is, no single time slot is more important than any other), users’
choosing a single transmission strategy rather than varying their
behaviors maximizes their impact on the performance.
IV. ATTACK MODEL
Malicious attackers aim to degrade the network performance.
Thus, we consider an attacker that intends to minimize the
utility function subject to its power constraint:
minimize U subject to γ
∫
f
J˜k(f) df ≤ Pk, ∀k ∈M (5)
and that there is collusion among jammers. Thus, attackers
learn and share all information, including the secret key for
control packets, with one another through a secure, covert
communication path. Also, attackers do not care more about
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subset of users.
We are mainly concerned with two types of DoS attacks:
false reservation (wasting network resources) and jamming
(injecting noise to decrease reliability of communication). False
reservation is the more efficient attack of the two, since it
allows an attacker to make a big impact while using less
power. Without any countermeasures, each attacker can send
a short reservation request message and reserve a channel for
an extended period of time (which is supposedly to be used for
data transmission), preventing legitimate users from using the
resource. This requires only small amount of power to deliver
control packets (since whether the channel is used during
reserved period is not checked or regulated) and attackers
can use the majority of their power to jam and disrupt the
communication of legitimate users. Therefore, attackers will
first falsely reserve the bandwidth as much as possible, and
then jam the rest of the transmissions on the frequency band
that is being used by other users (as described in Section III-B,
attackers are capable of accessing non-contiguous frequency
band).
For the frequency band occupied by legitimate users, attack-
ers need to decide whether to choose narrowband jamming or
wideband jamming. We observe that Ri is a decreasing and
convex function of J˜k(f). Hence, by Jensen’s inequality, the
minimum value of its statistical expectation E[Ri], under the
constraint in Equation 5, is attained by choosing E[J˜k(f)]
for every frequency f . Thus, to minimize capacity, jammers
will conduct wideband jamming across the channels that are
being used by all legitimate users as opposed to targetting and
jamming a specific set of users. SWIFT [16], as described in
Section III-B, can be used for attackers’ wideband jamming
to avoid wasting jammer power on the portion of frequency
band that they have already falsely reserved. Since attackers
perform wideband jamming across all channels, legitimate users
do not benefit from spreading the spectrum, e.g., via frequency
hopping.
For each transmission period, all users need to agree on the
same bandwidth allocation to be coordinated. In scenario where
a trusted entity does not exist, all users need an algorithm to
reach consensus. This introduces another attack where attackers
attempt to shift the consensus to their advantages. This sec-
ondary attack on distributed channel coordination is discussed
in Section V-C.
V. SECURE CHANNEL RESERVATION SCHEME
We devise a countermeasure for false reservation attack that
not only maximizes the spectral efficiency providing optimal
performance but also forces the optimal attacker strategy to
become jamming. Our scheme consists of two parts. We first
design a bandwidth allocation scheme where we assign band-
width to a user according to the observation of the received
power from the user. Then, we devise a distributed channel co-
ordination scheme where users agree on bandwidth allocation.
A centralized coordination scheme, which we also study, does
not require exchanges among users, since a trusted entity can
broadcast the bandwidth allocation information according to its
own observation.
A. Bandwidth Allocation
We assign bandwidth according to the observed received
power, that is, the bandwidth assigned to a user is proportional
to the amount of the user’s received power. In other words,
receiver only respects a user’s channel request proportionally
to the amount of power that user emits on the data channel.
Therefore, an attacker needs to emit power on the (data) channel
in order to make a valid bandwidth reservation request for
the following transmission. Since attackers can not simply
reserve a channel without emitting any power on it, as they
could without a countermeasure scheme, their limited power
capabilities force them to choose between reserving channels
and jamming legitimate transmissions.
When attackers transmit on their reserved data channel
and consume bandwidth, we do not distinguish them from
legitimate users. Even though attackers’ transmissions on their
reserved channels do not contribute to the network performance,
e.g., no meaningful messages, it is difficult to determine and
detect bogus data packets before application layer. Therefore,
we do not aim to identify attackers in our work.
We use received signal power and not the transmitted power
to determine the amount of bandwidth because transmitted
power estimation requires the estimation of channel states and
distances between any transmitter-receiver pair, which is a
difficult task and makes the scheme more complicated. More
importantly, the actual SINR which determines capacity is
computed on the receiver side and thus depends directly on
the received signal power. In Section III-C, we constructed a
rate expression for our performance metric, namely, Equation 3,
that is a lower bound of the actual capacity and uses the
received power level (as opposed to the transmitted power and
the channel gains).
Suppose our bandwidth allocation scheme using observations
on the received power results in
−→
W ∗ where its i’th element, W ∗i
corresponds to the bandwidth assigned to user i. Since we do
not want to waste bandwidth, we allocate the entire frequency
band, i.e.,
∑
i∈T W
∗
i = W . Now, we claim that our bandwidth
allocation scheme also yields optimal performance (that is, it
maximizes the network utility function, Equation 4) and provide
a sketch of proof.
Claim 1:
−→
W ∗ = argmax
{W1,...,WT }
U =⇒ W ∗i = W ·
P ∗i
P
, ∀i ∈ T (6)
where P ∗i is the received signal power on the channel reserved
by user i and P is the total network power on the reserved
channels, i.e., P =
∑
i∈T P
∗
i
Proof: For simplicity of proof, we assume equal channel
gain (γ) for all channels, equal noise power spectral density
(N0) over all frequency, and fixed strategy with respect to time
for attackers (which we later show to be the optimal strategy
in Section VI-C). We first study the case where all users who
reserve and transmit on their reserved channels contribute to
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jamming and none on reserving channels, which is the optimal
jammer reaction to our scheme, i.e., P ∗i = 0, ∀i ∈ M, as
detailed in Section VII). Using Equations 1, 2, 4, we observe
that U (which is a summation of E[Ri]) is a concave function
with respect to P˜i(f) from Equation 1. Jensen’s Inequality
yields E[U(P˜i)] ≤ U(E[P˜i]). Therefore, in order to maximize
the expected utility function, the network needs to have constant
power spectral density across the entire frequency bandwidth
W , i.e., P˜i(f) = PW ,∀f . Thus, users who have greater power
capability needs to have proportionally greater bandwidth,
yielding W ∗i = W · P
∗
i
P .
Now, we consider the case where attackers transmit on data
channels and reserve bandwidth, i.e., ∃i ∈M, P ∗i 6= 0. In this
case, attackers are indistinguishable from legitimate users and
the proof is the same as the case where attackers use all their
power for jamming instead of transmitting on the reserved data
channel.
B. Channel Coordination
The bandwidth allocation scheme in Section V-A is per-
formed individually by each user. Before data transmission,
all users need to agree on the same bandwidth allocation,
which process we call channel coordination. Otherwise, their
transmissions will overlap and cause collisions resulting in poor
performance. In a centralized scheme, the trusted entity can
simply broadcast its bandwidth assignment to the users.
However, in scenario where such trusted entity does not
exist or is offline, we need to share the observations and reach
consensus. After gathering all users’ observations (assuming
reliable delivery, secure broadcast, discussed in Section III-A,
is used to exchange the values of every users’ observations),
users choose the median of the received power observations.
Since all users choose median from the same set of values, they
reach consensus. (the Byzantine General’s Problem solution
using signed messages [18] also solves the problem). We
also propose a commit-and-reveal protocol that conceals the
observation values until all values are exchanged and gathered
by every users, which motivation and procedure is detailed
in Section V-C. In this paper, we study the performance of
both the centralized and the distributed scheme for bandwidth
coordination.
C. Attack on Distributed Channel Coordination
Unfortunately, using median to reach consensus for dis-
tributed channel coordination is vulnerable to an attack where
attackers attempt to distort the consensus to their advantages.
Since attackers know each other, they can distort the median
value by reporting favorable values (i.e., high received power)
for fellow attackers and low received power for others. Due
to variable channel conditions and channel fading, the reported
observations of received power vary between all users and the
consensus median value will be shifted towards the value that
the attackers report. Also, the use of median introduces an
additional constraint that must be placed on the number of at-
tackers: M < T2 (this constraint is not necessary in a centralized
scheme); otherwise, the attackers outnumber legitimate users
and has direct control over the median and thus the bandwidth
allocation outcome.
Attackers that know legitimate users’ received power obser-
vations know exactly what the median is and how much they
can distort it. We hide the legitimate users’ reports of received
power values by committing the reported values and then
revealing them after all reports are gathered. Using one-way
hash function, a commit-and-reveal protocol conceals the power
observations until all reports are broadcasted and gathered. In
our protocol, the committed value is the hash of the received
power and the corresponding hash function while the revealed
value is the received power; only after all the committed values
are broadcasted will users reveal the received power.
An attacker detection scheme using thresholds can prevent
attackers from reporting extremely big or small values. How-
ever, even with a scheme that hides the legitimate users’ reports
(that we described in the pervious paragraph), such threshold-
based detection scheme can be defeated by attackers who
infer other legitimate users’ observations based on the past
reports. Attackers can then decide how much to distort the
median by reporting moderately biased values while avoiding
being detected. Not only is a threshold-based detection scheme
ineffective but it can also degrade the performance due to
false positives; such a detection scheme will mostly detect
unintentional outliers (who are legitimate) and may degrade
the future performance by punishing benign users. Therefore,
we do not consider such detection schemes.
Even though the attack of distorting coordination outcome is
inherent in a distributed algorithm (where attackers contribute
to the outcome) since it is difficult to determine which users
are attackers and all reported observations are weighted equally
when reaching consensus, a more sophisticated algorithm (as
opposed to using the median) for distributed channel coordi-
nation scheme may be able to reduce attackers’ advantage. We
leave the design of such a protocol as future work.
VI. THEORETICAL ANALYSIS
Our problem reduces to two-party scenario between legiti-
mate user network (consisting of users who wish to maximize
network utility) and attacker network (with malicious entities
who want to degrade network performance). This is not only
because we assume cooperative behaviors among benign users
and collusion among attackers, but also because our bandwidth
allocation depends only on the received power.
Our bandwidth allocation assigns bandwidth proportional
to the power level and depends on the power capabilities
of the legitimate/attacker network but not on the number of
users/attackers. For our analysis, we connect the two variables
by assuming that all users have the same power constraints. In
other words, all individual users, including attackers, have the
same power constraints, P¯ , i.e., Pi = P¯ , ∀i ∈ T . Then, the
power capability ratio of the legitimate user network to that
of the attacker network is T−MM , and we control the power
capabilities of the two groups by varying the number of users
(T ) and attackers (M ). Also, all legitimate users i have the same
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and attackers care equally about all users. We denote the
capacity of individual users with Rc, i.e., Ri = Rc, ∀i ∈ T ,
for centralized scheme, and with Rd, i.e., Ri = Rd, ∀i ∈ T ,
for distributed scheme. For simplicity of analysis, we introduce
a variable α (normalized to the power emitted) that indicates
the portion of attackers’ power that they will transmit on
data channels to perform false reservation attack and decrease
bandwidth, and thus, 1 − α portion of power will be used for
jamming other channels, i.e., Jk = 1− α, ∀k ∈M.
A. Capacity for Centralized Scheme
A centralized scheme does not need an explicit channel co-
ordination mechanism (i.e., exchanging control packets among
all network users) since a trusted entity (which is known to be
non-malicious) can assign bandwidth to users corresponding
to its observations. In this section, we study the network
performance of our centralized scheme. Since the attacker
network uses (α · P¯ ·M ) amount of power for false reservation
(and [(1 − α) · P¯ · M ] amount of power for jamming), the
amount of bandwidth that a legitimate user is able to reserve
is Wi = WT−M+Mα where the denominator T − (1 − α)M
indicates the number of valid reservations made. This reduces
Equation 3 into the following:
Rc = W
T −M +Mα · log2
1 + SNR
T
T−M+Mα +
M(1−α)
(T−M) SNR

Since Uc = (T −M) · Rc,
Uc =
(T −M) ·W
T −M +Mα · log2
1 + SNR
T
T−M+Mα +
M(1−α)
(T−M) SNR

B. Capacity for Distributed Scheme
When we lack a trusted authority, we need to coordinate
bandwidth allocation among users. We study the capacity per-
formance under our channel coordination scheme using median
detailed in Section V-B. We also consider the attack described
in Section V-C where attackers report less received power if
the signal originated from a legitimate user (thus providing
some disadvantage to the legitimate user) and more received
power if it originated from a colluding attacker (advantageous
to the attacker). The bandwidth advantage that an attacker will
have over a legitimate user is denoted with β; as discussed
in Section V-C, attackers can reserve more bandwidth than
legitimate users with the same amount of power, i.e., β ≥ 1,
since attackers know each other while legitimate users do not
know who are malicious. Figure 1 plots β, the ratio ot the
expected amount of bandwidth an attacker can reserve to that
of a leigimtate user when they use the same amount of power,
while assuming Rayleigh fading. The number of attackers, and
thus the number of their reports, affect the distorted median
of the received power which directly correlates to bandwidth.
Under such attack, a legitimate user’s bandwidth for its data
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Fig. 1. Ratio between attacker’s bandwidth and legitimate user’s bandwidth
under the attack on distributed channel coordination. T = 100.
communication becomes T − (1 − αβ)M , yielding per-user
performance (Rd) and the network performance (Ud) of:
Rd = W
T −M +Mαβ · log2
1 + SNR
T
T−M+Mαβ +
M(1−α)
(T−M) SNR

Ud =
(T −M) ·W
T −M +Mαβ · log2
1 + SNR
T
T−M+Mαβ +
M(1−α)
(T−M) SNR

Compared to our centralized scheme, our distributed scheme
yields more bandwidth to attackers (by the amount of β) when
they reserve channels.
C. Attacker Reaction to Our Scheme
Our scheme, detailed in Section V, forces attackers to either
reserve a channel (to waste bandwidth) or jam the other users’
transmissions (to cause interference) by requiring power use on
data channels to validate their future requests for bandwidth. In
this section, we explore the optimal attacker strategy given our
channel reservation scheme. Namely, we claim and show that
attackers will use a deterministic strategy (rather than a mixed
strategy where they vary α with respect to time) in order to
minimize the network utility. To incorporate the dependence
on time, we define U to be the aggregate network utility over
time, i.e., U = ∑t Ut where Ut is the network performance
(expressed in Equation 4) at time t. We also define αt to be
the amount of power attackers use to reserve a channel rather
than jamming at time t.
Claim 2: Given αˆ that yields minimum U ,
αt = αˆ, ∀t yields the minimum network performance, U .
Proof: We use the network utility function expression,
Equation 7, for centralized scheme in this proof (the proof for
distributed scheme follows the same procedure). From Equa-
tion 7, both (T−M)·WT−M+Mα and log2
[
1 + SNR
T
T−M+Mα+
M(1−α)
(T−M) SNR
]
are convex, monotonic, and positive for all possible α. There-
fore, the product, Uc is also convex with respect to α. By using
Jensen’s inequality, αt = E[αˆ] = αˆ, ∀t yields the minimum
network performance, U .
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7VII. SIMULATION EVALUATIONS
In this section, we simulate the bandwidth allocation and the
channel coordination scheme that we discussed in Section V
under Rayleigh fading. To show the performance of our scheme,
we compare it to the case when there is no countermeasure and
the conventional slotted channelization approach is used when
dividing the bandwidth, (i.e., frequency band is divided equally
into multiple channels that have fixed center frequency), which
we define to be the baseline performance (we assume that all
the slotted channels are utilized, e.g., the frequency band is
divided into the same number as users). For baseline perfor-
mance, as detailed in Section IV, attackers reserve channels
without consuming power and use all their power to jam the
rest of the legitimate transmissions (we assume that control
packets are considerably smaller than data packets, so that
the power required to transmit control packets are negligible
compared to that for data packets). Thus, baseline performance
itself varies with the power capability of the attacker network,
M . In our simulations, in addition to the aggregate capacity
performance of our scheme, we show the capacity gain, which
is defined to be the aggregate capacity of our scheme divided
by the aggregate capacity of the baseline performance. Thus,
the number of legitimate users who contribute to the network
performance (T − M ) becomes irrelevant for capacity gain
and the metric corresponds to the gain of an individual user’s
performance over the case when there is no countermeasure.
As pointed out in Section VI, the power capabilities of
the two parties, i.e., legitimate user network and attacker
network, affects the network performance for our bandwidth
allocation scheme. When analyzing our simulation plots, we
observe that attacker network has a power capability of
M
T out of the entire power consumption of the network
while legitimate user’s is T−MT . We first study the cen-
tralized scheme in Section VII-A and then the distributed
scheme in Section VII-B. The parameters we use are: T =
100 transmitters,SNR (without interference) = 15dB,W =
20MHz and the number of malicious entities, M , are varied
and specified in the plots.
A. Centralized Scheme
Figure 2(a) plots the network rate performance (expressed
in Equation 4) in bits per second with respect to the attacker
strategy, specifically, α, which determines how much power
attackers will use to make valid reservations for bandwidth.
We observe that, when the power capability of the attacker
network is smaller than that of the legitimate user network,
attackers’ wideband jamming with all their power, i.e., α = 0,
is more destructive to the network than consuming power to
transmit on data channels and effectively reserving bandwidth.
Thus, the optimal attacker strategy, which we denote with αˆ,
is to jam with all of its power, i.e., αˆ = 0. Also, the network
performance increases with the amount of power attackers use
for transmitting on reserved channels, α.
On the other hand, when attackers have comparable amount
of or more power capabilities than the legitimate user network,
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Fig. 2. Simulations for Centralized Scheme (T = 100)
7
8αˆ > 0 (and using some power to reserve channels) becomes
the optimal attacker strategy. For example, in Figure 2(a), when
attackers have as much power capability as the legitimate users,
i.e., M = 50 out of T = 100, αˆ = 0.2 attackers will transmit
on data channels with αˆ = 0.2 of their power capabilities (for
valid channel reservations and bandwidth consumptions) and
use the rest of the power 1 − αˆ = 0.8 to jam the rest of the
channels where legitimate users transmit on. The optimal at-
tacker strategy diverges from α = 0, since attackers’ impact on
the network grows logarithmically with respect to the attackers’
jamming power while the impact of reserving channels grow
linearly. Therefore, as attackers’ power capabilities grow, their
impact of reserving and consuming bandwidth outgrows that of
jamming legitimate transmissions as attackers have more power
to use.
In Figure 2(c), to compare the optimal attacker strategy and
pure jamming, we plot the performance ratio between the case
when optimal attacker strategy (that minimizes the network
performance) is used, i.e., α = αˆ, and when attackers jam
at full power, i.e., α = 0, with respect to the fraction of
attacker nodes in the network. We observe that, when malicious
users are less in numbers than normal users and have less
power to emit than legitimate users (and thus channel link
has sufficiently good quality, i.e., sufficiently high SNR), either
αˆ = 0 or the performance between α = αˆ and α = 0 yields
minimal difference. For example, from Figure 2(c), αˆ = 0
until about 45% of the network nodes are compromised and
there is only 2.5% difference in performance between α = 0
and α = αˆ = 0.2 when M = T − M = 50. Therefore, in
most practical scenarios (where attackers do not overwhelm the
network by substantially outnumbering legitimate users and are
capable of providing too low quality of channel links), α = 0
is the optimal jammer strategy or yields negligible difference
to the optimal strategy.
In Figure 2(b), we compare our scheme to the baseline
performance by plotting capacity gain. Our scheme not only
outperforms the baseline performance for all possible scenarios
(capacity gain is always greater than one) but also provides
more resistance to attacks as the attackers’ capability grow (ca-
pacity gain increases as M increases); the network performance
degrades much more quickly as the attackers have more power
without our scheme.
B. Distributed Scheme
Our distributed scheme evaluation yields similar properties
to those of our centralized scheme. However, from Figure 3(a)
in which we show our distributed scheme’s aggregate capacity
performance in bits per second and from Figure 3(b) in which
we plot the capacity gain, we observe that optimal attacker
strategy diverges more from α = 0 than the centralized
scheme due to the attack on coordination process described
in Section V-C; attackers have more motivations to reserve
channels since they gain more bandwidth advantage (denoted as
β and studied in our analysis in Section VI) when they reserve
channels. For example, when M = 30, α = 0.24 is the optimal
strategy for distributed scheme (Figure 3) whereas α = 0 is the
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9optimal attacker behavior in the centralized scheme (Figure 2).
Figure 3(c) compares the performance of the optimal attacker
strategy (α = αˆ) and only jamming (α = 0) by plotting the
ratio of the corresponding network rate performance between
the two strategies (MT ≤ 0.5 as detailed in V-C). From the plot,
αˆ = 0 if less than 27% of network users are compromised by
attackers.
The additional vulnerability created by distributively coordi-
nating bandwidth allocation information also causes a decrease
in performance gain over that of baseline performance (as
shown in Figure 3(b)) compared to the simulations for cen-
tralized scheme. Nevertheless, our distributed scheme always
outperforms baseline performance.
Furthermore, in contrast to the centralized scheme, we ob-
serve that the capacity gain can decrease as the number of
attackers (M ) increases in the distributed scheme. For example,
M = 45 yields smaller capacity gain than M = 5 in Figure 2(a)
for some α. This phenomenon is due to the fact that the
attack on distributed channel coordination results in the attacker
bandwidth reservation advantage, which grows rapidly with
respect to M , dominating the performance when there are
many attackers. As shown in Figure 1, M = 45 results in
attacker capable of reserving five times as much bandwidth
than legitimate users if the same amount of power were used for
reservation, i.e., β = 5. Therefore, as the number of attackers
grows close to that of legitimate users, our distributed scheme
becomes less effective (attackers have total control over the
scheme if they have as many as or are greater in number
than legitimate users as detailed in Section V-C). However,
our distributed scheme works well when there are many more
legitimate users than attackers.
VIII. CONCLUSION & FUTURE WORK
This paper studies a multi-channel environment with DoS
adversaries who not only reserve bandwidth without the in-
tention of using it but also jam legitimate transmissions. Our
countermeasure consists of a bandwidth allocation scheme
based on the observations of received power and a channel coor-
dination protocol that enables all users to reach a consensus for
bandwidth allocation. We study both centralized and distributed
scenarios and prove that our bandwidth allocation scheme is
designed for the optimal performance. Our evaluations yield
that, in practical scenarios, our scheme either restricts optimal
attacker behavior to jamming (as opposed to falsely reserving
channels, which is generally the more efficient attack) or
yields very close performance to when attackers only jam, and
provides considerable gain over the case where there is no
countermeasure in all situations.
We leave some problems for future work. Instead of using
median to reach a consensus for channel coordination, we
can devise a more sophisticated protocol that minimizes the
impact of attacks on channel coordination. Also, all values that
are reported and exchanged for received power observations
contribute equally to the coordination outcome. Techniques
from reputation systems can be used to establish more trust to
users who have been more responsible about their past channel
reservations. Furthermore, in a totally distributed setting, i.e., a
trusted offline third party for key setup and identity validation
is not available, we can devise a computation-based scheme
(such as that proposed by Juels and Brainard [19]) to distribute
keys a priori and to counter sybil attack. Finally, overhead
analysis and evaluations using hardware experiments will add
more practicality to the scheme.
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